Related
Africa has the highest level of food insecurity of all continents while also having the most rapid population growth. The previous article argued that most countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) facing this double challenge can best address it by simultaneously raising their food production (yields per hectare) and lowering their population growth (particularly fertility rates). This combined strategy can also generate economic growth and help reduce dependency on food imports. In addition, lower fertility rates help to sooner attain a potential so-called “demographic dividend”, when the ratio of working-age people to dependent people (children and the elderly) exceeds 1.7 and most of these working-age people actually find jobs. Today the ratio is just 1.3. Policies need to be differentiated depending on the food security level and the demographic situation of the country.

In this article we illustrate and test this argument on the homeland of the second author: Ghana.

Questions on Ghana
Following up on the previous article, we deal with the following questions:
  • What is the annual growth rate of cereal production, cereal area and yield per hectare?

  • What can the country do to accelerate yield growth?

  • What is the annual growth rate of the population and fertility?

  • What’s the population policy of Ghana and how effective has it been so far?

  • What can be done to make it more effective?

  • What policies are needed to enhance food security and advance and harness the future demographic dividend?

We start with a brief profile of Ghana.
Box 1. Ghana: some characteristics
  • Geography: Ghana is a West-African country that stretches from the Atlantic coast in the south to the Sudan savanna in the north. Going from southwest to northeast, humidity declines.

  • Population: 34 million inhabitants. Most of the population belongs to three ethnic groups: Akan (47.5%), Mole-Dagbon (16.6%) and Ewe (13.9%).29

  • Urbanisation: in 2024, 60% of the people lived in cities (particularly in the capital Accra), well above the Sub-Saharan Africa average of 40%.30

  • Religions: the most important religion is Christian (71%, including 28% Pentecostal/Charismatic, 18% Protestant, 13% Catholic, 11% other), followed by Islam (18%) and traditional (5%). The remaining 5% have no religion. Memberships are growing most among Islam and Pentecostal.

  • The average income (GDP per capita) in 2024 was 2.406 US$, well above the Sub-Saharan Africa average (1.441 US$).

  • Economic sectors: unlike many other Sub-Saharan African countries, the number 1 economic sector is services (47%), including wholesale and retail trade, transport, information and communication technology (ICT), financial intermediation, and public administration. It is followed by industry (32%), which includes electronic, car and light manufacturing, aluminium smelting, food processing, and cement production. Agriculture (22%) is third.

  • By contrast, about 52% of the labour force is engaged in agriculture, 29% in services and 19% in industry.31

  • Food crops were in 2021, in order of total production in metric tons: cassava, yam, plantain, rice, taro (= cocoyam), maize, rice, groundnut, sorghum, cowpea, soybean and millet.32 Ghana is the number 2 plantain producer in the world after Cameroun.

  • Major cash crops are cocoa, oil palm, rubber and citrus.33 After neighbouring Côte d’ Ivoire, Ghana is the world’s number 2 producer of cocoa. Cocoa and cocoa paste are the third export product of the country after gold and crude petroleum.

  • 3% of agricultural land is irrigated, mostly rice and vegetables.

  • Food security: by January 2025 Ghana ranked number 65 on a global list of 124 countries, which was the highest rank of all Sub-Saharan African countries.34 However, FAO estimates that between June and August 2025 about 2 million people were acutely food insecure due to 1) high food and non-food inflation rates, and 2) drought, particularly in the north.35

  • The unemployment rate in 2014 was 3%, well below the 10% on average in Sub-Saharan Africa. For youth (aged 15-24) it was higher (5.4%), yet also below the Sub-Saharan Africa average (10%).

Agriculture
We focus on the recent history of agriculture. In the period 2017- 2023, when the population increased by 17% and cereal production by 98%, i.e. 5.8x faster, an impressive performance! Cereal yield increased somewhat faster (39%) than did cereal area (32,5%).35 Such a pattern, rather similar to that of Senegal mentioned in the previous article, is not only beneficial for food security but also for economic growth, since yields per hectare also grew 2.3x faster than the population. However, the substantial area expansion must have been detrimental to nature and the climate, at least where it did not replace other crops but savannas, forests or wetlands.

Of course, food security does not only depend on cereals (maize, sorghum, millet and rice). They are not even the main food crops in Ghana. In 2017, roots and tubers (cassava, yam, taro = cocoyam) and plantain combined even produced 9x as many tons as did cereals. By 2021, the ratio had declined to 7.7. This indicates the cereal production had grown faster than the production of starchy non-cereals.37

Anyway, food security and self-reliance, at least in calories, have benefited. On the Global Hunger Index, Ghana improved its score from 16.2 in 2017 to 13.7 in 2023.38 The economy did benefit as well since yields of both cereals and starchy non-cereals grew faster than the population.

Population growth
Here we go further back in history to show long-time trends. Between 1980 and 2023, Ghana’s population increased almost 5-fold from 7 to 33.8 million. Based on World Bank figures, the growth rate between 1980 and 2020 declined from 2.9% to 2% (Figure 1), while fertility rates dropped from 6.5 to 3.5 births per woman (Figure 2). Infant mortality dropped sharply from 90 to 28 deaths per 1.000 live births (Figure 3). This is in line with the demographic rule that lower infant mortality rates are often followed by lower fertility rates.

Comparable figures for Sub-Saharan Africa were 2.6, 4.5 and 75, respectively. So Ghana has been performing relatively well in the demographic transition.



According to the Ghana Statistical Service (2021) and the Institute of Statistical, Social and Economic Research (2023),39 the population structure is shifting from a child-dominated pyramid to one with more people at their middle-ages, signalling gradual ageing. The share of children aged 0-14 years declined from 41.3% in 2000 to 35.3% in 2021, while the proportion of young people (15-35 years) increased from 34.6% to 38.2%. With a ratio of 66 dependent to every 100 working-age people (corresponding to a reverse ratio of 1.5, which is above the average 1.3 for SSA), these shifts suggest Ghana is moving closer to a potential (!) demographic dividend.

That dividend can be fully harnessed only if effective policies are put in place to equip the youth with skills and capacity needed to advance Ghana’s development.40 Even more important and difficult: enough jobs must become available for the growing number of adolescents.
Cilliers (2025, chart 10)41 expects Ghana, Kenya and Rwanda to enter a potential demographic dividend in 10 to 20 years, sooner than all other West, Central and East African countries.

Population policy
Ghana has a population policy since 1969. We took the following from an article by Kwankye and Cofie (2015):42

The first comprehensive population policy was adopted in 1969 to curb rapid population growth and promote socio-economic development, with family planning as its central strategy. Despite the launch of the Ghana National family planning programme in 1970, progress was limited, largely benefiting urban areas while fertility rates remained high. In 1986, after years of implementation, it became clear that it had only made partial gains in propagating family planning, mainly in the urban areas, although about 70% of the population at the time was still resident in rural areas. Challenges included weak political will, cultural pronatalism, overburdened health systems, and an overemphasis on family planning at the expense of broader demographic concerns.

These challenges led to the 1994 policy revision, developed after broad stakeholder consultation and supported by the National Population Council to ensure more inclusive and effective implementation. Moreover, a six-volume Action Plan was developed alongside the country’s population policy to guide implementation, covering areas such as maternal and child health, family planning, women and development, capacity building, communication, and research monitoring. The plans outlined goals and objectives [not specified], strategies, and activities, identified responsible agencies, and detailed the required resources, expected outcomes, and timeline for execution.

The previous article listed 5 strategies to mitigate fertility rates, ending with family planning. However, family planning and contraceptives use have not been welcomed by everyone. Culture plays a key role.

Cultural influences
We first focus on religions.

Presbyterian Church
One study43 among Presbyterian (Orthodox) church members revealed that the perspectives of the church on family planning methods are diverse. A majority of members (52%) acknowledged that family planning is not a sin, while the remaining members either lacked knowledge on the subject or expressed uncertainty as to whether family planning is considered a sin within the teachings of the church.

Perception of whether family planning constitutes a sin significantly influences its acceptance and utilization. Religious and moral values often play a central role in shaping individual and community attitudes toward reproductive health practice. Although the church provides teachings on its stance regarding family planning, individuals are not strictly bound to accept these views. Rather, they may interpret the issue for themselves and make decisions based on what they believe is best for their circumstances.

However, many respondents hold a negative attitude towards family planning, with most citing lack of knowledge, cultural beliefs, or partner opposition as reasons for non-use. In addition, despite improvement in the health service delivery, cultural norms, especially among Akan communities, which value large families and male decision-making, remain barriers. This attitude has changed in recent times among adolescents. Adolescents with higher education tend to have a more positive attitude towards sexual and reproductive health including family planning. Presumably, this is because schooling provides them with accurate knowledge about the body, how family planning works, and why safe sexual practices matter. It helps reduce their reliance on myths and misconception.

Roman Catholic Church
The Roman Catholic church has consistently opposed modern contraception, permitting only periodic abstinence. This position has been emphasized in key Church documents, including Amoris Laetitia (2016), Dignitas Personae (2008), and Evangelium Vitae (1995), all of which condemn artificial reproduction, abortion and sterilization. The most comprehensive explanation appeared in Pope Paul VI’s Humanae Vitae (1968), which argues that natural methods respect the body’s fertility, while artificial ones deliberately block conception. Together, these teachings highlight the Church’s enduring and firm opposition to contraception, regardless of the circumstances.44

The Church’s stance against artificial contraception and preference for natural methods has significantly influenced members’ choices of family planning. In a study conducted in Offinso Municipality in the Ashanti region, 48 out of 140 respondents reported that their decisions were shaped by the teachings of the Church.45 The remaining respondents pointed to factors such as knowledge of birth control methods (32), affordability (24), health and safety concerns (16), personal choice (14), whereas the remaining 6 did not provide an answer. These findings illustrate how Church doctrine remains an important influence on family planning practices, though socio-demographic factors also play a role.

Pentecostal Churches
We couldn’t find much information about the stance of the Pentecostal Churches in Ghana on family planning. One regional study46 argues that they emphasize sexual abstinence before marriage as their main form of birth control, discouraging premarital sexual activity rather than explicitly promoting modern contraceptives. This doctrine delays childbirth by encouraging young people to complete education, find work, and marry before starting families. Within this framework, abstinence is seen as a test of faith, a way to build trust, and a marker of moral respectability. However, pre-marriage abstinence does not necessarily lead to lower fertility rates, as it can also work as an incentive to marry earlier.

Islam
As for Islam, Wulifan and Bagah (2015)47 argue that the Quran does not explicitly address contraception, leading Muslim scholars to rely on analogical reasoning (Qiya) and consensus (Ijma) to determine its permissibility. While some, like Sheik Abu Sohra, argue that contraception goes against the procreative purpose of marriage and may encourage promiscuity, Hadiths and practices such as “al-azl” (coitus interruptus) indicate its acceptability. Most Islamic jurists, particularly in the Hanafi school, distinguish between contraception and abortion, while permitting methods that prevent pregnancy without permanently affecting fertility.

In addition, the authors focussed on the Wa municipality in the Upper West region of Ghana and interviewed 120 males about the use of contraceptives. They found perfect knowledge and awareness of contraceptives (100%) among subjects. 24% practised family planning, while 75% disapproved. The most frequently mentioned contraceptive methods were condom, injectables and oral pills. Age, number of wives and educational level of respondents were significantly correlated with contraceptive use. However, the number of children did not show any significant correlation with contraceptive use. This reflects Islamic teachings that permit birth spacing but discourage limiting the overall number of children.

Yusuf (2014)48 argued that some Muslims perceive contraception as a western secular practice that conflicts with Islamic tradition and undermines women’s role as child bearers and caretakers. In addition, although contraception is widely known in the country, many Muslim couples give it low priority due to the desire for large families, and some fear a reduction of the Muslim population [!]. Yet in an interview study among Muslim couples, 37% had earlier accessed health professionals on reproductive (contraceptive) issues. There was a disconnect between the reproductive health providers and communities. He also complained “…the existence of contraception, particularly condom, as a protection against pregnancy and STDs [Sexually Transmitted Diseases] has impacted negatively on the reproductive morality of the young sexually active Muslims in Ghana.”49

Membership of religions
The fear of reducing the population of a religion may also play a role in other religions. There may be a parallel with the Netherlands, where the demographic rivalry between Catholics and Protestants in the interbellum is considered a cause of the relatively fast population growth in the country after WW II.50 For Sub-Saharan Africa, such a rivalry would risk escalating and turning into a demographic disaster, including unrest and revolts between religious groups, while delaying or even preventing a demographic dividend. Religious leaders have a responsible role to play.

Not all religions are growing at the same rate. Between 2000 and 2021, the fastest growing religions in Ghana were Islam (from 15.9 to 19.9%) and Pentecostal/charismatic (24.1 to 31,6%). Memberships of Catholic (15.1 to 10.0%) and Traditional religions (8.5 to 3.2%) had been declining.51
As a relevant note: there seems to be no significant link between ethnicity and religion in Ghana.52

What role does gender play?
We couldn’t find much information about the role of gender in fertility rates in Ghana. The cited study among Presbyterians noted women are not the sole decision-makers in the use of family planning methods (contraception), even though most traditional and modern options are applied by them. In some cases, women adopt family planning methods at the request of their husbands.
One study among a representative sample of 1,528 Ghanaian couples in monogamous marriages found the mean desired number of children for husbands to be higher than for their spouses: 5.4 and 4.7, respectively.53 The authors suggested a simple explanation: men do not primarily go through the physical and psychological demands of pregnancy.

Back in 1985, anthropologist Ester Boserup, dealing with Africa at large, explained it from agricultural history (see Box in previous article) and from legislation (see Box below).
Box 2. Ester Boserup on gender and fertility rate
In 1985 the famous anthropologist Ester Boserup wrote about gender differences in desired family size in Africa and linked it to legislation:

“Where fathers are allowed to pass the burden of family support onto the mother, men's motivation for fertility limitation is weak, even if the economic motivation for large families has disappeared. In these circumstances, the effect of economic and structural change on family size is delayed. This is very important in Africa because of the strong sex hierarchy, in which men are the decisionmakers in family matters and women are socialized to the role of hard-working mothers of large families, seeking economic security in this role.

Changes in family legislation giving men more responsibility for their children and wives would no doubt promote their interest in family limitation. Women might also be more motivated to restrict family size if their marital insecurity were reduced by changes in family legislation.”

This hypothesis still deserves consideration.

Birth control by breastfeeding
Abstinence is not the only method of natural birth control. Extended breastfeeding is another one. One study54 notes that among Ghanaian women, especially the Akan, exclusive breastfeeding has traditionally been used as a method of birth spacing. However, mothers are encouraged to breastfeed for six months only, as longer breastfeeding naturally reduces fertility. Introducing additional food and drinks during this period is often discouraged, since it may interfere with lactational amenorrhea. Thus, extended breastfeeding is culturally accepted as a way to responsibly manage reproductive health, birth spacing and pregnancies. Reduced fertility may or may not be a result.

Opinions about demographic dividend
Opinions about the demographic dividend in Ghana differ widely. Cilliers (2025, chart 10) expects Ghana to attain it in approximately 10 to 20 years. By contrast, Kwankye et al. (2021) warned the dividend was already almost over.55 They used the same definition as Cilliers for the first phase (!) of the dividend: “a period when the working-age population surges relative to the dependents”. But Cilliers does not expect a dividend before a surge to a ratio of 1.7:1.

Interestingly, when Kamala Harris - then vice-president of the US - visited Ghana in 2023, she gave a very optimistic speech, saying: “The median age on the African continent is 19. By 2050, one in four people in the entire world will be on this very continent. That of course means that what happens on this continent will impact the entire world.” She did not specify what kind of impact, nor what it could be for Africa itself.56 Nor did she explicitly mention the demographic dividend.

Ayaga A. Bawah, Director of the Regional Institute for Population Studies (RIPS), University of Ghana, has more concerns.57 When speaking on the policy implications of the 2024 World Population Prospects and the 2021 Population and Housing Census projections, he shared three major insights of the demographic trends likely to influence Ghana’s development trajectory over the coming decades. He acknowledged the growing youth population as a critical factor, projecting that by 2050, one-third of Ghana’s population will be adolescents. He also emphasized that effectively investing in youth through education, skills, and employment could yield a demographic dividend that boosts economic growth and development. However, he also warned that failure to support this demographic development could pose substantial social risks.

Based on this statement, the demographic dividend can be viewed as a strategic goal for Ghana, as it reflects the country’s aspiration to harness its population dynamics to accelerate economic growth and social development. Yet risks of the demographic trends are on the radar.58

Perspectives
What are the perspectives for agriculture, food security and a demographic dividend in Ghana?

Agriculture
If Ghana pursues not just food security but also economic growth and development, yield growths are key. Fortunately, the yield gaps are still large, at least those in cereals.
Take maize: the average actual yield on rain-fed land is 1.8 tons/ha but the potential yield is no less than 12.1 tons/ha!59 Experts often assume that 80% of this yield is attainable: 9.7 tons/ha, so the exploitable yield gap is (9.7-1.8=) 7.9 tons/ha. Growing from 1.8 to 9.7 tons/ha is a 5.4-fold increase. Comparable ratios are 5.3x for rice, 5.3x for sorghum and 3x for millet. This means enormous yield gains are possible in Ghanaian cereals even without area expansion.

Fully bridging such gaps will take many decades. During the Green Revolution in Asia the average yield growth was approximately 50 kg/ha/year.60 At this rate, fully closing the exploitable yield gap of 7.9 tons/ha in maize would take (7.900:50 =) 158 years! Projections for such a long period of time make little sense as there will be enormous unknown changes in the context, in climate alone. However, something remarkable has happened in Ghana in recent years: cereal yields increased much more rapidly than 50 kg/ha/year. Between 2017 and 2023, they increased by 68%. In absolute terms, average yields in maize increased from 2.01 to 2.78 tons/ha.61 So the average growth was 0.77 tons/ha = 770 kg/ha in six years, or 128 kg/ha/year, which is 2.6x the growth rate of the Green Revolution in Asia! For rice the ratio was even higher (3.8x), although for sorghum and millet it was lower (1.1x and 1.4x, respectively).62

If we assume a growth rate of 100 kg/ha/year can be sustained, bridging the complete yield gap would not take 158 but 79 years – which by the way is still too large a time frame to make credible forecasts. We better choose the horizon of 2050. Then a yield growth of 25x100 = 2,500 kg/ha can have been attained. Total yield would then reach (1.8+2.5=) 4.3 tons/ha, which is (4.3/1.8=) 2.4x the actual yield. Attaining such growth rates is not simply a matter of applying more fertilizer. It also requires soil amendments (manure, compost, lime), higher-yielding seeds and better crop protection means. In addition, better access to education, non-commercial extension services and capital.

Better transport, storage and cooling facilities can improve access to city markets, where prices are higher. Locally, irrigation can also contribute.63

All this requires a consistent holistic agricultural policy which creates an enabling environment for farmers to increase productivity. More specifically, creating better access to markets of inputs and produce, supporting investments in transport infrastructure and processing industries, and sustain and stabilize prices for farmers. More stable prices can be achieved by reducing internal trade barriers in the African Union, while simultaneously raising tariffs on cheap staples (not on fertilizers!) from the world market, which would also reduce import dependency.64

We should keep in mind, however, that climate change will be a disruptor. Drought risks can be reduced on the entire agricultural area by soil amendments that help conserve water, and locally by investments in irrigation.

Population
Meanwhile the population of Ghana is projected to increase by a factor of 1.5 from 35.1 million in 2025 to 52.5 million in 2050.65

Therefore, if the currently high yield growth rate of 100 kg/ha/year can be sustained, it can outpace the annual population growth rate by (2.4/1.5=) 1.6x or 60%. That would be amply sufficient to keep per capita cereal production at the current level and also reduce the number of undernourished people. It can also help mitigate both area expansion and import dependency. Area expansion will often take place on less fertile soils and will typically harm biodiversity and the climate. Import dependency is a burden on the trade balance and the economy and entails the risk of food shortages in times of price spikes on the world market. That risk became obvious in 2020 after the Covid outbreak, when prices of wheat skyrocketed and imports plummeted by 97%.

High yield growth rates can also contribute to economic growth and development, higher incomes and cheaper food, which in turn may moderate wages and accelerate job growth.

These advantages can be further harnessed if Ghana manages to accelerate the current decline of population growth rate by further lowering fertility rates from 3.5 to, say, 2.5. That requires intensifying the current population policy, focussing on lower child mortality, more and longer education for girls and young women, and family planning on a strictly voluntary basis. The country would by all means avoid or reduce demographic rivalry between religions and ethnic groups. For that purpose, the government would cooperate with religious and ethnic leaders.

Over time, such a policy would also reduce the risk of Gen Z-like social unrest in response to job shortages. And bring closer a potential demographic dividend. However, to harness that dividend, the number of jobs will have to grow faster than the number of adolescents. That of course requires much more than accelerating yield growth.

Conclusions
  1. Ghana is facing three major social challenges: food insecurity, low incomes and high unemployment among adolescents. However, it is performing much better on each of these challenges than the average Sub-Saharan Africa country.

  2. Agriculture can be a key sector to address all of these challenges. Food production then needs to grow faster than the population, primarily through yield growth rather than farmland expansion.

  3. Farmland expansion typically does not contribute much to the economy but yield growth does. Yields need to grow much faster than the population, as they have already been doing since 2017.

  4. Continuation of this trend requires an active and coordinated agricultural policy to create an enabling environment for farmers.

  5. Accelerating the steady decline of the fertility rate from 3.5 to, say, 2.5 births per woman can be an additional key factor to improve food security and boost the economy. In tandem with the higher food production, it can help reduce dependency on food imports and farmland expansion, reverse farm fragmentation,66 enhance more efficient farming and thereby reduce food prices, which in turn may help mitigate wages, creating better opportunities for competitive industries, services and associated jobs.

  6. Over time, it can also bring the potential demographic dividend closer, which would otherwise take 10 to 20 years. However, that dividend can only be harnessed if the number of jobs will grow faster than the number of adolescents. If not, social unrest will be hard to avoid.

  7. Reducing fertility rates should be strictly voluntary and may require combined efforts of the government and religious and ethnic leaders to prevent any sort of demographic rivalry.

  8. If Ghana manages to integrate agricultural, trade and population policies, major social and economic progress comes within reach.


We thank Professor Leo van Wissen for comments on an earlier draft of this article.

Wouter van der Weijden is an expert in agriculture and the environment.

Emelia Atabo is a native of the upper East Region of Ghana and a graduate of the international Institute of Social Studies (ISS) in The Hague. She holds a masters in Agrarian, Food and Environmental Studies. “I am passionate about addressing food security and population challenges through research, data analysis, and evidence-based policy solutions”.
Sources

Note: The numbering of the footnotes starts at 29. The earlier notes can be found in the first article of this two-part series.

  1. https://statsghana.gov.gh/ghfactsheet.php (Accessed: 2 October, 2025)

  2. Data 2024. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.1524.ZS?locations=ZG-GH-ZA-BW-ET. Figures may be somewhat misleading as it is difficult to distinguish between formal and informal jobs.

  3. https://www.fao.org/ghana/fao-in-ghana/ghana-at-a-glance/en/

  4. https://statsghana.gov.gh/ghfactsheet.php (Accessed: 2 October 2025). https://mofa.gov.gh/site/images/pdf/AGRICULTURE%20IN%20GHANA%20(Facts%20&%20Figures)%202021.pdf

  5. Global Yield Gap Atlas (Accessed: 2 October 2025).

  6. https://www.globalhungerindex.org/ranking.html

  7. https://www.fao.org/giews/countrybrief/country.jsp?code=GHA&lang=es

  8. Between 2017 and 2021 (the most recent year reported) the maize area increased from 985,000 to 1,266,000 hectares, and rice from 241,000 to 357,000 hectares, whereas millet decreased from 156,000 to 125,000 and sorghum from 224,000 to 192,000 hectares. https://mofa.gov.gh/site/images/pdf/AGRICULTURE%20IN%20GHANA%20(Facts%20&%20Figures)%202021.pdf. Table 4.1. Replacement of millet with the higher-yielding maize has been common across West Africa (Van Ittersum et al., 2025).

  9. The Ministry of Food and Agriculture reported: between 2016/18 and 2019/21 production growth rates for maize were 54%, rice 40%, millet 27% and sorghum 34%. Growth rates of starchy non-cereals except plantain were lower: 25% for cassava, 19% for yam, 14% for cocoyam and 35% for plantain. More recent figures were not reported. https://mofa.gov.gh/site/images/pdf/AGRICULTURE%20IN%20GHANA%20(Facts%20&%20Figures)%202021.pdf, Tables 4.4 and 4.5.

  10. https://www.globalhungerindex.org/pdf/en/2023.pdf

  11. https://census2021.statsghana.gov.gh/, https://www.google.com/search?q=Ghana+Statistical+Service+(2023)

  12. Providing enough education for children can be financed better when the number of children declines. This applies at the national level as well the microlevel: with 3 children, parents can afford more and longer education for each of them than with 4 or 5.

  13. Cilliers, J. (2025) Harnessing and advancing Africa’s future demographic dividend. WRR, Netherlands Scientific Council for Government Policy.

  14. Kwankye, S.O. & E. Cofie (2015) Ghana’s Population Policy Implementation: Past, Present and Future. African Population Studies 29 (2): 1734-1748.

  15. Adjei, S., Abrokwah, E. & Boaheng, I. (2024) The Church and the Use of Family Planning: A Case Study of the Presbyterian Church of Ghana, Ebenezer Congregation, Old Tafo. http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/.

  16. Greguš, J. (2019) Catholicism and contraception. Ceska Gynekol 84 (6): 468-474.

  17. Akonnor, M. & Opoku, J.K. (2025) Birth Control and the Catholic Church: Implications for Some Selected Churches in the Kumasi Archdiocese, Ghana. E-Journal of Religious and Theological Studies 11 (3): 60-71.

  18. Bochow, A. (2012) Let's talk about sex: reflections on conversations about love and sexuality in Kumasi and Endwa, Ghana. Culture, health & sexuality, 14 (sup1): S15-S26.

  19. Wulifan, J.K. & Bagah, D.A. (2015) Male involvement in family planning in Muslim communities in Wa municipality, Ghana. Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences 5: 86-97.

  20. Yusuf, J.B. (2014) Contraception and sexual and reproductive awareness among Ghanaian Muslim youth: Issues, challenges, and prospects for positive development. SAGE Open 4 (3), p. 2158244014541771.

  21. Yusuf also cited official statistics indicating that 16% of all births in Ghana were unwanted, 40% were unplanned, and 24% were mistimed.

  22. Knippenberg, H. & S. Vos (2010) Tussen crisis en verzuiling: regionale verschillen in vruchtbaarheid in Nederland tijdens het interbellum. In: J. Kok & J. Van Bavel (eds). De levenskracht der bevolking. Sociale en demografische kwesties in de Lage Landen tijdens het interbellum. Universitaire Pers Leuven.

  23. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Religion_in_Ghana.

  24. International Religious Freedom Report 2022 Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. USA state.gov. Retrieved August 3, 2023.

  25. Yeboah, I., Okyere, J., Ofori Duah, H., Kweku Conduah, A. & M. Naana Essiaw (2023) Analysis of Couples’ Discordance on Fertility Desire in Ghana. Genealogy 7 (3): 48.

  26. Tawiah-Agyemang, C., Kirkwood, B.R., Edmond, K., Bazzano, A. & Hill, Z. (2008). Early initiation of breast-feeding in Ghana: barriers and facilitators. Journal of perinatology, 28 (2): S46-S52.

  27. Kwankye, S.O., Frempong-Ainguah, F., Arthur, E. & Amporfu, E. (2021) Understanding the demographic dividend in Ghana, Sierra Leone and The Gambia: Prospects or missed opportunities? Ghana Journal of Geography 13 (1): 25-49. They state: “Ghana has a window of opportunity to harness its first [!] demographic dividend - a period when the working-age population surges relative to the dependents. This began in the 1980s and is expected to close by 2030. This leaves Ghana with only a few years remaining to capitalize on its demographic potential. The time left for the demographic dividend to close is shorter. Thus, a lot would have to be done by way of strategic investments to equip and absorb the large army of youth for productive jobs to make the dividend a development-oriented prospect". Their concern about jobs was justified.

  28. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dMiaEb-uQuwbe

  29. Bawah, A.A. (2024) Key Demographic Trends for Ghana’s future at GSS and RIPS event.
    Regional Institute for Population Studies, University of Ghana.

  30. Like Ghana, Kenya is just one or two decades away from a potential demographic dividend. But recently, social unrest among young people (Gen Z) has been heavy. Six out of every ten Kenyans aged 15 to 34 are unemployed. This stark reality exploded on the streets in 2024 (…). Beneath the veneer of the agitation against proposals to raise taxes and spiralling inflation lay a more debilitating crisis: a generation with degrees and diplomas, albeit locked out of the job market. https://www.trtafrika.com/english/article/c20cb5a87857
    However, according to the World Bank, the unemployment rate in Ghane is currently 3%, lower than in Kenya (5.4%).

  31. Source: Global Yield Gap Atlas. The Ghanaian Ministry of Food and Agriculture notes much lower potential yields. For example: 5.5 tons/ha for maize instead of 12.1 tons/ha (9.7 of which considered attainable). This is because their definition is different: “potential yields refer to yields that have been achieved in cases where more effective extension and use of recommended technologies have occurred”. This is less high than the biophysically maximum attainable production. Therefore, the yield growth potential is much higher than MoFA assumes. But of course, this maximum is not easily attained.
    https://mofa.gov.gh/site/images/pdf/AGRICULTURE%20IN%20GHANA%20(Facts%20&%20Figures)%202021.pdf, Table 4.6.

  32. E.g. Yuan, S. et al. (2024) Intensifying rice production to reduce imports and land conversion in Africa. Nature Communications 15, article nr 835.

  33. Figures taken from USDA and FAO https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/maize-yields?tab=chart&country=GHA

  34. A recent study reported very low yield growths in maize between 2019 and 2021. However, these results were affected by the Covid pandemic. Fertilizer use was economically viable for only 28% of the farmers, partly due to the increased price of fertilizer following the pandemic. The authors strongly recommended a change from simple fertilizer use to Integrated Soil Fertility Management (ISFM), from broadcasting fertilizers to targeted application and to link farmers to city markets for favourable output prices. Adzawla, W. et al. (2024). Fertilizer use efficiency and economic viability in maize production in the Savannah and transitional zones of Ghana. Frontiers in Sustainable Food Systems 8–2024. https://doi.org/10.3389/fsufs.2024.1340927

  35. The Irrigation Development Authority reported: “In the past the medium and large Irrigation projects have been managed by the IDA under liberal conditions which may be termed ‘Civil Service Approach’. This was not encouraging in generating enough revenue to support the operation and maintenance of the projects. The result is that most of these projects have run into a state of disrepair and require huge sums of money for their rehabilitation.” (…) “The priorities of the Authority will be on the development of small-scale and micro-scale schemes, better management of flood plains, and an optimum use of existing irrigation facilities as a means of increasing productivity.” https://mofa.gov.gh/site/directorates/sub-vented-organization-soes/irrigation-development-authority.
    Currently, only 1.6 per cent of the potential 1.9 million irrigated hectares is under irrigation, significantly below the West and Central African average of 13.9 per cent. Minister Eric Opoku of Food and Agriculture is aiming at an extension by 10,000 ha to help switch farmers from rain-fed seasonal to all year-round cultivation. If raw materials are grown, this would provide an uninterrupted supply to processing industries. https://www.myjoyonline.com/agric-ministry-rolls-out-irrigation-for-wealth-creation-in-8-regions/. However, this area is only 0.2% of the country’s arable land.

  36. This import dependency is still high for cereals. In 2021/22 Ghana had a total need of 4.6 million MT, of which 0.79 million MT or 17% was imported whereas almost zero MT was exported. https://mofa.gov.gh/site/images/pdf/AGRICULTURE%20IN%20GHANA%20(Facts%20&%20Figures)%202021.pdf, Table 4.19.

  37. https://statsghana.gov.gh/gssmain/fileUpload/pressrelease/10_World%20Population%20Day%202024%20press%20release%20from%20GSS_shared.pdf. The figure for 2025 was taken from Worldometer.

  38. The average farm size is less than 1.6 hectares. https://www.fao.org/ghana/fao-in-ghana/ghana-at-a-glance/en/. Even small farms are sometimes fragmented due to the large number of children.